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1333 
Metatheory 
Garrick B. Pursley* 
Constitutional theory has been challenged in recent years, by 
significant figures in the legal field, as essentially pointless.  Too much 
normativity, not enough neutrality; too much conjecture, not enough 
data; too much politics, not enough truth.  How should we constitutional 
theorists answer this basic challenge to the foundation of our research 
program?  I suggest one possible solution here: we can make the 
discipline more rigorous by changing the way in which we assess 
competing claims in constitutional theory.  Drawing on important work 
in epistemology, the philosophy of science, and legal theory, I examine 
the question of theory assessment and selection.  I propose a set of 
criteria for constitutional theory selection consistent with the most 
cutting edge work in these fields and explain how we can use these 
criteria—simplicity, consilience, conservatism, and fruitfulness—and 
demonstrate how they operate to make theory assessment more 
sophisticated by applying them to two distinct sets of competing 
theoretical claims.  Along the way, I discuss perennial debates like the 
controversy between those who claim that adjudication should be 
conducted with reference to legal reasons only and those who claim that 
courts may consider extra-legal reasons, including moral reasons, to 
decide cases.  I then turn to examine a much more recent debate about 
the nature of certain doctrinal structures in constitutional adjudication.  
I argue, in the end, that more nuanced theory assessment techniques will 
advance constitutional theory in a manner that simultaneously answers 
foundational challenges and makes the research program more likely to 
produce testable, provable claims about the nature of constitutionalism 
going forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judge Posner and, more recently, Judge Wilkinson have issued a fairly 
stout challenge to constitutional theorists1: show that constitutional 
theory is actually good for something or abandon it as a crumbling, 
Ptolemaic research program.  I want to answer this challenge by 
undermining its hidden premise—namely, that constitutional theory is 
not actually rigorous enough to disclose truth or generate real knowledge 
such that it can only be valuable, if at all, in an instrumental sense.  My 
goal here is to rebut this premise by developing a way to make 
constitutional theory somewhat more rigorous. 
In this Article, “metatheory” means the analysis of the properties of 
theories in some field.  Here, I will focus on constitutional theory and on 
one particular metatheoretical problem: constitutional theory choice or 
assessment.  Theorists have no well-settled criteria for choosing among 
competing theses and are all over the place with respect to how to 
proceed.  I will canvass proposals that exist in the current literature and 
develop a proposal of my own regarding how we should do constitutional 
metatheory.  The big issue here seems to be whether we should treat 
constitutional theory as a descriptive or normative discipline for 
metatheoretical purposes.  I will argue that we must develop different 
assessment regimes for each category of claim—descriptive and 
normative, and perhaps others—because constitutional theory 
inescapably involves both kinds of claims.  And, contrary to the view that 
has stymied previous metatheoretical efforts, we cannot evaluate 
descriptive and normative constitutional theory claims according to a 
 
1. See Richard Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (Madison 
lecture); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2012). 
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single criterion or set of criteria.  Instead, because descriptive and 
normative claims serve different functions (or have different objectives), 
they must be assessed differently. 
Constitutional theory does not have much of a literature on theory 
selection criteria,2 and what there is suggests normative criteria—
Professor Fallon, for example, argues that  
the choice among theories should be based on which theory will best 
advance shared, though vague and sometimes competing, goals of (1) 
satisfying the requirements of the rule of law; (2) preserving fair 
opportunity for majority rule under a scheme of political democracy; 
and (3) promoting substantive justice by protecting a morally and 
politically acceptable set of individual rights.3 
But this cannot be right generally, because normative criteria are 
inappropriate for descriptive constitutional theory claims—claims that 
aspire to reveal what is the case, rather than demonstrate what should be 
the case.  Or so I shall argue.4 
Theory assessment is arguably not objective—for normative theories 
this is probably obvious, though it will need some explaining because I 
will argue eventually that we want to adopt a process that brings us closer 
and closer to objectivity.  For positive (or descriptive) claims, this is more 
 
2. There have been a couple of preliminary efforts in other fields of legal theory that are not 
obviously immediately applicable to constitutional theory claims of the kind I consider here.  See, 
e.g., Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2009) 
(deploying a set of theory selection criteria for assessing competing claims in general 
jurisprudence); W. Bradley Wendel, Explanation in Legal Scholarship: The Inferential Structure 
of Doctrinal Legal Analysis, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1041–42 (2011) (exploring theory 
selection criteria for legal theory generally, and in particular legal theory claims of the following 
form: “(1) Here is some legal doctrine or rule; (2) courts and scholars . . . tend to think that its point, 
rationale, purpose, or function is X . . . ; (3) but I think they’re mistaken, and the doctrine is really 
‘all about’ Y; (4) here is some evidence supporting my claim; (5) therefore, we should understand 
the point of the rule or doctrine as Y.”). 
3. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 538–
39 (1999).  Fallon’s discussion is in a sense confusing—he argues that a “sound” constitutional 
theory should satisfy this sort of composite normative criterion, see id. at 538, but by “sound” he 
must not mean logically sound, as a logically sound theory (having true premises and a conclusion 
that follows logically from those premises) will not necessarily comport with Fallon’s evaluative 
criteria.  Put simply, logical soundness is a criterion distinct from other evaluative criteria, as I 
argue criteria for descriptive effectiveness are distinct from criteria of normative desirability. 
4. Different criteria are probably appropriate for different kinds of theories—we can distinguish 
(1) descriptive or positive theory claims whose object is to say something accurate about what there 
is; examples include realism, attitudinal modelers, etc.; (2) prescriptive or normative theory claims 
whose object is to say X should be the case (or Y should not be the case); examples include 1 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1998); 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); and (3) conceptual theory claims; examples include 
ADRIAN VERMUELE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011); Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin 
Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 545 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307 (2008). 
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controversial and bound up in the movement from the verificationism that 
held sway in the nineteenth and early twentieth century to the realization 
occurring after Kuhn, Quine, and Hempel that even in science, theory 
assessment criteria are in some sense subjective. 
One thing that seems clear is that theory selection rubrics should be 
selected according to the broad purpose of the category of theories to 
which the candidates that you are assessing belong.  Thomas Kuhn 
argues that there is not an objectively correct set of theory selection 
criteria—it is no longer generally viewed as correct to characterize 
scientific theories as actually disclosing true facts about the world; 
instead, we say that they approximate truths about reality, and these 
theory selection criteria are meant to identify the likely more accurate 
approximation among competitors.5  Accordingly, in science, theories are 
evaluated on criteria that are broadly considered appropriate in the light 
of the general characteristics and aims of science as a practice.6  There is 
some debate, of course, about what distinguishes science from other 
forms of inquiry;7 but it seems relatively uncontroversial to suggest that 
science as a practice “avoids appeals to final causes, vital forces, or 
general bunkum,” “answer[s] to criteria of empirical adequacy,” and 
makes claims that are “general, capable of supporting counterfactuals, 
and above all . . . that purport to be true or false with reference to 
something external; that is, science must relate to the natural world.”8  
Given these aims, it is unsurprising that criteria for theory selection that 
enjoy consensus support among scientists include simplicity, consilience 
(or explanatory power and capacity), conservatism (or consistency with 
other well-accepted views about the world), and potential fruitfulness for 
future research.9 
 
5. This is a matter of serious debate in the scientific and philosophical communities; thus, rather 
than defend at length a controversial position, I am instead assuming that the best a descriptive 
constitutional theory claim can aspire to is an accurate approximation of the reality of our 
constitutional norms.  More might be possible, but I set that possibility aside here. 
6. See Wendel, supra note 2, at 1051–52; Thomas Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment and 
Theory Choice, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND 
CHANGE 320, 320–21 (1977); Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive 
Theory Choice, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 259, 269 (2013). 
7. See, e.g., infra notes 58–65 (discussing the controversy surrounding Popper’s attempt to 
demarcate science). 
8. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1060–61 (citing ROBERT NOLA & HOWARD SANKEY, THEORIES OF 
SCIENTIFIC METHOD 55–56, 74–77, 341–44 (2007); CARL G. HEMPEL, The Logic of Functional 
Analysis, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
SCIENCE 297, 304 (1965)). 
9. Kuhn, supra note 6 at 320–22; see Brian R. Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism 
Reconsidered, in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND 
NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 59–80 (2007) (applying criteria of explanatory capacity, 
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The few theorists to have considered the question of theory assessment 
in legal theory suggest that a similar account of the “characteristics and 
virtues” of law as a practice should inform the choice of evaluative 
criteria.10  They tend to view legal reasoning and thus legal theory as 
inherently normative; based on this view they maintain that at least some 
of the criteria for theory selection must be drawn from the substantive 
“background” normative commitments of legal practice.11  I do not think 
anyone believes that incorporating such a criterion is logically necessary 
or that theory assessment is impossible without doing so;12 and I doubt 
that such a criterion would be appropriate or yield broadly acceptable 
results given the absence of consensus on just about any value drawn 
from legal practice that could serve as a theory selection criterion.13  
Consistent with this position of intrasystemic neutrality, I will orient the 
following discussion in terms of my aim of explaining what law courts 
are applying in structural cases—that is, the aim to make a theory-of-law 
claim—and assess alternative theories that claim the same goal.14  The 
competitor theories are the value-based and interpretive theories some 
examples of which were discussed above.  To be clear, the choice here is 
between these theories, which hold that the content of the law is only that 
which accords with some value proposition or interpretive theory, on the 
one hand, and my view on which we recognize both norms constituted by 
deep patterns of convergent official practice and norms validated 
according to one—or more than one—alternative theories as parts of the 
 
“ontological austerity” (simplicity), and consistency with empirical research programs 
(conservatism) to argue that legal positivism is the best going general theory of law). 
10. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 3, at 538–41 (arguing that basic values of the legal system must 
bear on theory choice); Wendel, supra note 2, at 1060 (“I believe a criteria of theory-acceptance in 
legal scholarship can (and indeed must) be derived from higher-order characteristics and virtues of 
legal reasoning as a practice.”). 
11. See supra notes 16–73 and accompanying text; see also Wendel, supra note 2, at 1061–64 
(considering whether the assessment of explanations in legal theory should be “connected with 
wider normative and epistemological” commitments). 
12. Cf. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1063 (expressing uncertainty about incorporating substantive 
value-based criterion into theory assessment; leaving open the question whether such an approach 
is possible or justifiable). 
13. See supra notes 16–73 and accompanying text.  This is not to deny that the entire project of 
selecting among competing theories is inherently normative—of course it is, but that it is makes 
only second-order normative claims about what constitutional theorists should do and believe and 
is in this sense similar in normative orientation to the application of the inference to the best 
explanation approach in scientific theory selection.  Cf. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1049 (noting the 
inherent normativity of inference to the best explanation). 
14. Cf. Bartrum, supra note 6, at 269 (noting that Kuhnian “value judgments” about theory 
selection are not entirely idiosyncratic; and instead, observing scientific practice suggests that 
scientists “assess competing theoretical paradigms against the values [they] judge[] to be most 
important to a particular scientific endeavor”). 
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Constitution, on the other.15 
Accordingly, our theory selection process should vary as between 
descriptive legal theory claims and normative constitutional theory 
claims.  I will argue that we can readily analogize descriptive theory 
claims to scientific theory claims and import theory selection criteria 
from the sciences for use in law, and I will illustrate how this might work.  
The caveat here is that two criteria one frequently sees in discussions of 
scientific theory assessment—falsifiability and predictive power—are 
not always apt in the context of descriptive legal theory (artifacts, deeply 
opaque causal sequences, etc.).  This is of course not to say that predictive 
hypotheses are impossible in law—the attitudinal model, and large 
volumes of empirical legal theory in commercial law fields, demonstrates 
that it is.  But not all descriptive legal theories are readily empirically 
testable.  That, alone, does not render them invalid or less good than 
competing theories (often, the directly competing theories will suffer this 
same flaw).  What we want is a second-best set of criteria to apply where 
falsification and predictive power are inapt.  I will discuss inference to 
the best explanation criteria as a good set of criteria in this regard.16 
The much more difficult metatheoretical problem is how to choose 
among normative legal theory claims.  I will hope to resolve a conceptual 
problem with the approach to normative theory choice that is suggested 
in the tiny literature that exists on the question.  They suggest using 
normative criteria from within the competing theories (evaluating 
theoretical claims according to their tendency to promote justice, the rule 
of law, and so forth), but that cannot be right; it is question begging.  We 
need more work on this problem and I will make some preliminary 
suggestions about what that research program should look like. 
In Part I, I canvas the literature on theory assessment in legal theory 
and then draw lessons from work on theory evaluation from the 
philosophy of science to suggest ways in which we can improve our 
theory assessment methods in law.  The point is to articulate a set of 
criteria by which we may effectively compare theoretical claims that 
compete with one another and say, with some plausible certainty, that one 
is better or more correct than another.  My focus will be on constitutional 
theory claims, but the criteria that I endorse here can be applied to most 
claims in legal theory.  The bulk of Part I focuses on positive (descriptive) 
 
15. This idea of a combination of merit-based and merit-neutral criteria of legal validity is 
predicated on my neutrality as between inclusive legal positivism, which allows that a given rule 
of recognition might validate some norms as law based on their merits, and exclusive legal 
positivism, which does not. 
16. See infra note 24. 
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claims in legal theory; that is because for the most part normative claims 
are foreign to the sciences.  But I will turn in the last section of Part I to 
consider the more difficult challenge: evaluating competing normative 
claims in legal theory.  While I cannot resolve the difficulties attendant 
to the task of assessing such claims here—there is basic work in 
epistemology that remains to be done to complete that task—I will hope 
to frame future research on this issue.  In Part II, I turn to an application 
of these insights, applying the evaluative criteria that I develop in Part I 
to a very nuanced claim in constitutional theory—namely, the argument 
that it is beneficial to distinguish a category of constitutional doctrines 
(“anti-evasion doctrines”) from other such categories.  I examine the 
purported benefits of this claim, and the ways in which it compares to 
other claims in what has come to be called metadoctrinal constitutional 
theory, to demonstrate the usefulness of the theory assessment tools I 
propose here.  The conclusion is preliminary, and provisional: It seems 
that we can deploy a more rigorous system of theory assessment criteria 
in legal theory.  It will take a number of additional applications to move 
this metatheoretical insight to the center of the legal theory research 
program.  But if we do that, we can answer Judge Posner’s and Judge 
Wilkinson’s challenges, and make legal theory more acceptable across 
disciplines.  And that is no small thing. 
I.  POSITIVE THEORY ASSESSMENT 
Selecting among positive (descriptive) theories is not easy, but at least 
it is not terribly controversial.  There is a ready analogue in the 
philosophy of science. 
A.  The Analogy to Science 
There is nothing objectionable in principle about applying normative 
criteria in selecting among competing constitutional theories; it is just not 
the kind of evaluation I want to highlight here.  I want to distinguish 
theories by the likely correspondence of their descriptive claims with 
reality; normative criteria distinguish theories by their likely practical 
results if adopted.  As Fallon argues, “theories should be judged by their 
likely fruits.  To determine which theory would best promote ultimate 
goals, it is crucial to assess what kinds of judicial decisions would likely 
be made if a particular theory were adopted.”17  He goes on to argue that 
“methodological” theories—that is, theories that do not entail any 
particular substantive outcomes, like legal positivism18—are of “less 
 
17. Fallon, supra note 3, at 538–39. 
18. See John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 201–02 (2001) 
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clear” attractiveness.19  But this is simply a different question to ask about 
constitutional theories, and it bears no necessary (logical or empirical) 
relationship to my question about descriptive accuracy.  Moreover, 
applying normative criteria to select among descriptive theories of law is 
question begging; after all, the goal of such theories is to provide an 
accurate picture of what the constitutional law is, and theorists tend to 
claim that “the Constitution” or “our constitutionalism” is the source of 
the values that form the basis for normative assessments.20  To the extent 
that descriptive constitutional theories of law, to satisfy the consilience 
criterion (or, more roughly, Fallon’s “fit” criterion), must identify which 
values out of the field of possibilities are in fact accepted in constitutional 
practice or otherwise entrenched in constitutional law, then we cannot 
evaluate the success of the theory based on assumed values that the theory 
itself is supposed to identify. 
Descriptive legal theory, which purports to reveal what is the case, is 
distinct from scientific theory for various reasons: Law is different from 
the natural phenomena that are the objects of science insofar as law is not 
a natural kind—it is an artifact that is constituted by human practice.21  
Among other things, human practices and their artifacts may change over 
time while physical phenomena (for the most part and excepting quantum 
mechanical phenomena) remain fixed regardless of human observation or 
action.  Moreover, the object of descriptive constitutional theory—
constitutional practice—is a notoriously difficult, moving target; for 
example, “a number of interpretive paradigms can coexist peacefully in 
constitutional practice, and no one paradigm is likely to force the others 
out of business.”22  Even if some of our constitutional norms can be 
clearly identified, then, it is very difficult to use that information to 
predict practical outcomes in the light of the widely varying approaches 
observable in constitutional practice under which constitutional norms 
may be given legal effect in constitutional disputes.  For this reason, 
among others, one typical scientific theory evaluation criterion—
 
(explaining that legal positivism’s core claim—norms are legal norms in virtue of their sources, not 
their merits—is “normatively inert”). 
19. Fallon, supra note 3, at 539. 
20. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 551 (“[I]n identifying three commonly accepted evaluative 
criteria for constitutional theories, I do not mean to offer transcendent or foundational arguments.  
Questions about appropriate evaluative criteria for constitutional theories arise within the same 
debates in which those criteria are invoked.”); Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional 
Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 598 (1999) (“Any claim that some set of [normative] priorities and 
[relative] weights [among such priorities] is best is itself a highly contestable claim of constitutional 
theory.”). 
21. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
22. Bartrum, supra note 6, at 272. 
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predictive power23—seems inapt for choosing among descriptive 
constitutional theory theses. 
Consider, for example, the question which of the following two 
positive legal theory claims is better: Realism versus some kind of 
Formalism (judges consider only the syllogistic legal reasons).  We will 
want to choose a way to evaluate these competitors according to their 
basic objective.  As that seems to describe accurately some aspect of 
reality, the natural analogue is scientific theory, and luckily there is very 
robust and well-developed literature on theory assessment and selection 
in science.  I cannot do it justice here, but I will provide an overview. 
Positive constitutional theory claims, like descriptive claims in other 
disciplines, should be subjected to the theory selection criteria that we 
apply to theories that aim to disclose what is the case (the truth about or 
at least our best estimate of reality).24  In this one, limited sense—that 
they aim to reveal something about what is the case—descriptive 
constitutional theory claims are like claims in natural and social sciences.  
This is emphatically not to assert something like “Langdell’s widely 
mocked claim that law can be treated as a science”;25 nor is it to deny that 
 
23. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN 
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 7–9 (1984) (arguing that the principal, perhaps only, proper test of a positive 
economic theory should be its predictive power).  Friedman’s view is broadly indicative of the 
falsifiability approach suggested by Karl Popper (under which the best way to test a theory is not 
to ask about its conformance to reality but instead about whether additional observations falsify it).  
See generally KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 150–
75 (1972); KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 44 (1968) [hereinafter POPPER, 
LOGIC].  Although the Popperian approach is routinely cited in legal literature, see Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351 (2001) (collecting 
citations), there is debate within the sciences and the philosophy of science about the propriety of 
these criteria for evaluating scientific theories.  Thomas Kuhn, for example, does not include 
falsifiability on his list of five criteria for choosing among scientific theories.  See Kuhn, supra note 
6, at 321–22 (noting scientific consensus on accuracy, simplicity, scope, consistency (internal and 
with other theories), and fruitfulness (not limited to predictive power, but more broadly a theory’s 
potential to “disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships among those already 
known”)). 
24. I am using the language of the inference to the best explanation approach to theory-building 
and explanation, rather than anything like a hypothetico-deductivist approach, to avoid vexed 
debates in the philosophy of science about the logical possibility of confirmation, whether science 
creates knowledge, and so forth.  For an overview of these debates, see generally CARL G. HEMPEL, 
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 5–51 (1966) (canvassing problems with deductive models of 
scientific explanation) [hereinafter HEMPEL, NATURAL SCIENCE]; NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 8, 
at 335–45 (canvassing the realism/antirealism debate in philosophy of science); CARL G. HEMPEL, 
Studies in the Logic of Confirmation, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION  (examining the 
hypothetico-deductivist method of confirming proposed explanatory hypotheses with empirical 
evidence); Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 J. PHIL. 88 (1965); Paul 
R. Thagard, The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76 (1978). 
25. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1064 (referring to Gilmore’s characterization of Langdell’s views 
in GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42–48 (1977)). 
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the process of assessing competing theories is inherently normative.26  (I 
want to set aside the question of what exactly an “explanation” is—both 
this and the related question of whether science or other descriptive 
inquiries describe reality (that is, reveal truth) or instead merely describe 
phenomena of our experience are controversial and would take more 
space than I have to engage.27  An intuitive sense of these concepts will 
suffice for the argument that follows.)  Instead, while acknowledging that 
value judgments inevitably inform the choice of theory selection methods 
in science, law, and other disciplines, we must cabin that normative move 
to its limited second-order status to avoid conflating the question what 
makes a good theory of law with the question what values does law serve 
or reflect, as the latter is the kind of question that some theories of law 
seek to answer.28  It may be that identifying what the law is requires the 
application of some moral, economic, or other criterion, but that is one of 
the core disputes between competing theories of law.  If we want to 
evaluate descriptive constitutional theory claims according to how well 
they discharge the aim of disclosing what is the case about law—that is, 
if we want to be able to select among competing descriptive constitutional 
theory claims according to which is the more descriptively accurate—
then the general theory selecting criteria developed in the philosophy of 
science should apply.29  We need not want to compare theories with 
similar objectives; we could instead merely want to critique (or praise) 
the claimed facts of the matter the theory serves up rather than determine 
the extent to which those claims accurately approximate reality.  But that 
is not the only position one could take, nor is it the most natural evaluative 
 
26. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321–22; Wendel, supra note 2, at 1064–65; see also Bartrum, 
supra note 6, at 269. 
27. Relevant debates in the philosophy of science include the methodological debate between 
hypothetico-deductivist explanation and inference to the best explanation, see supra note 24; and 
the epistemological debate between scientific realists (who argue that science explains reality) and 
anti-realists (who argue that science’s aim is to explain our experience, but there is no guarantee 
that our experience reflects reality), see NOLA & SANKEY, supra note 8, at 335–45. 
28. Compare, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 4 at 190 (arguing that any account of the concept of 
law must “explain how what it takes to be law provides a general justification for the exercise of 
coercive power by the state”), with H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 8, 239–40 (3d ed. 2012) 
(arguing that a general theory of law can be “morally neutral and [with] no justificatory aims: it 
[need] not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and structures which 
appear in my general account of law”). 
29. See generally Kuhn, supra note 6, at 327–29, for an argument that theory selection criteria 
in science are properly drawn by theorists based on their perception of the objectives of the relevant 
inquiry.  See also, e.g., Leiter, supra note 2 (applying the criteria of simplicity, consilience, and 
conservatism from the philosophy of science to argue that positivism is the better theory of law 
even if it explains certain minor phenomena less well than alternatives because it explains the 
majority of the phenomena of the legal system better than alternatives); Leiter, supra note 9, at 9–
13 (comparing, similarly, legal positivism to natural law theories and Dworkin’s theory). 
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posture to adopt with respect to descriptive claims.30 
B.  Assessment Criteria for Legal Theory Claims 
In the remainder of this Part, I apply the standard scientific theory 
selection criteria to compare my view with other positive theory-of-law 
claims in constitutional theory.  I explain each criterion, provide 
examples, and then argue that the thin-norms account of structural 
constitutional doctrine outstrips competing accounts on each of them.  
Theories may fare differently along different dimensions, and there is no 
consensus as to the weight that should be accorded, say, simplicity 
relative to conservatism; but it seems reasonable at least to think that 
theories may compensate for failure on some dimensions with success on 
others.31 
First, it is generally accepted in the philosophy of science, and science 
at large, that simpler explanations are preferable to more complex ones, 
all else equal.32  In arguing that legal positivism is preferable to 
alternative theories of law including natural law theory and Dworkin’s 
“law as integrity” account, Leiter highlights positivism’s “ontological 
austerity,” or its capacity to explain phenomena “in ways that do not 
involve unnecessary, controversial or incredible metaphysical 
commitments.”33  My explanation for the dormancy doctrines, 
immigration doctrine, and obstacle preemption is simpler than 
conventional accounts in two senses.  As I have argued elsewhere, 
positing a single implied structural norm to underwrite all these doctrines 
is simpler than conventional accounts that posit multiple underlying 
norms, perhaps one for each of these lines of doctrine—now beyond the 
dormant Commerce Clause, dormant Admiralty Clause, and dormant 
foreign affairs powers doctrines;34 State Preclusion Thesis (“SPT”) 
explains immigration doctrine more simply than conventional accounts 
such as the external sovereignty rationale;35 and obstacle preemption 
 
30. Cf. Gardner, supra note 18, at 203–04 (speculating that legal positivism may be 
misunderstood in part because “[l]awyers and law teachers find [its] comprehensive normative 
inertness . . . hard to swallow”). 
31. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 327–29 (noting this relative weights problem).  The truly 
troublesome case is where competing theories each excel the other one some, but not all, theory 
choice criteria.  Kuhn argues that in these marginal cases, theory choice is largely a value judgment 
particular to individual scientists.  See id. 
32. Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321–22. 
33. Leiter, supra note 9, at 12. 
34. See Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 497, 500–02 (2012) (discussing the 
simplicity advantage of the State Preclusion Thesis (“SPT”) account of the dormancy doctrines). 
35. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (articulating the external 
sovereignty rationale for federal immigration power); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent 
in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power 
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doctrine more simply than the conventional Supremacy Clause 
explanation about which I have noted in previous work.36  Further, the 
idea of a consensus-based constitutional norm like SPT is more 
ontologically austere than, for instance, a value-based account that posits 
additional, contestable rule-of-law or social justice principles to explain 
and justify these doctrines, with distinct normative cases to be made for 
each line of decisions.  Similarly, the thin norms account is more 
analytically austere than interpretive theory accounts insofar as it posits 
norms acceptable across interpretive disciplines and explains the shape 
of various doctrines according to pragmatic factors; it does not require 
the complex interpretive moves to derive the norms and explain their 
implementing doctrines that an originalist account would require. 
A second generally accepted criterion is consilience, or how many 
phenomena the competing theories are capable of explaining37: “We 
prefer more comprehensive explanations—explanations that make sense 
of more different kinds of things—to explanations that seem too narrowly 
tailored to one kind of datum.”38  Everyone agrees that theory must fit the 
phenomena under consideration—it cannot have explanatory power if the 
theory does not explain anything.39  But among competing theories that 
roughly fit some aspects of the phenomena under consideration, the 
consilience inquiry shifts to how many phenomena the theories explain, 
respectively.40  So, for example, “Darwin’s theory of natural selection 
was able to account for observations that initially seemed unrelated, such 
as those pertaining to anatomy (the presence of vestigial organs) and 
 
over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 253 (2002) (discussing and criticizing the “inherent 
powers” of sovereignty justification for immigration doctrine). 
36. See generally Pursley, supra note 34. 
37. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321; Thagard, supra note 24, at 79; see also, e.g., Leiter, supra 
note 2, at 1239–40 (applying consilience to assess legal positivism versus competing theories of 
law). 
38. Leiter, supra note 2, at 1239. 
39. Id. (emphasizing explanatory power as a desideratum for positive legal theories); Fallon, 
supra note 3, at 549 (“[I]t appears to be agreed all around—indeed, accepted as nearly definitional 
of the enterprise of constitutional theorizing—that one important criterion is ‘fit.’  A good 
constitutional theory must fit either the written Constitution or surrounding practice.  In the absence 
of a fit requirement, constitutional theory would lose its anchor in law and collapse into political 
theory.”); accord DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 65–68 (emphasizing the importance of explanatory 
“fit” for accounts of constitutional law and practice). 
40. See Thagard, supra note 24, at 79 (noting that a “theory is more consilient than another if it 
explains more classes of facts than the other”).  Fallon articulates a descriptive criterion, “fit,” and 
argues that “fit” must be with more than the text—it must fit with the larger “practice,” which is in 
a sense what I am pressing here.  Fallon’s “fit” criterion is somewhat imprecise—as is Dworkin’s, 
see DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 67–68.  Breaking this rough notion of “fit” out into the simplicity, 
consilience, and conservatism criteria is more precise, allows us to draw on the philosophy of 
science, and to compare theories for different kinds of fit issues. 
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zoology (the observed differences in related species).”41  As I have 
explained, the SPT view explains all at once a wide variety of doctrines 
that alternative accounts typically characterize as based on several 
different constitutional norms (and thus as in this sense unrelated).  A 
built-out theory including a few more SPT-like norms would ex hypothesi 
explain a great deal more, perhaps most structural doctrine.  Moreover, 
the interpretive and value neutrality of this thin-norms account means that 
it explains doctrines and judicial decisions that proponents of value-based 
or interpretive theories would have to characterize as non-lawful—for 
example, it explains why, despite the protestations of originalists that the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not legitimately derived from the 
original meaning of the Constitution,42 courts continue to apply the 
doctrine and other government officials systematically behave as though 
it is valid law.43  Originalists advancing a theory-of-law claim would 
have to maintain that the many judges and justices who appear to accept 
the validity of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in its current form 
are either mistaken about what the constitutional law is or are 
intentionally disregarding the law.44  Accuracy—a theory’s capacity to 
explain actual observations—is a closely related criterion.45  The thin-
norms view explains distinctions legal practitioners and scholars make in 
everyday talk between, say, what the law is and what the law should be; 
 
41. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1052. 
42. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260–63 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (attacking the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine because “[t]he historical record provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to 
be other than what it says—an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce”). 
43. Similarly, if we hypothesized a converse norm—the National Preclusion Thesis (“NPT”), 
namely: the national government may not take actions that undermine the constitutional structure—
to explain the anticommandeering doctrine, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161–63 
(1992), and other federalism doctrines; strict textualists might object that these doctrines have no 
textual foundation.  See, e.g., John Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009).  The NPT account, however, better 
explains the realities of practice in which these federalism doctrines continue to be applied and are 
treated as legally valid by most officials. 
44. Some originalists appear to embrace this consequence of their views and argue that non-
originalist precedent should be disregarded—see, for example, Gary Lawson, The Constitutional 
Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005), but this is 
hardly a consensus position among originalists.  See generally Leiter, supra note 2, at 1225–26 
(discussing error theoretic accounts in philosophy, and noting that “[a] standing puzzle about [such] 
accounts is why a particular discourse persists when all its judgments are false”); John O. McGinnis 
& Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009) 
(canvassing the debate and arguing that originalism can be reconciled with stare decisis). 
45. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 320.  See also Wendel, supra note 2, at 1054 (discussing an 
“empirical adequacy” criterion concerned with the extent to which competing theories “account for 
observed phenomena”). 
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many competing accounts cannot capture this distinction because they 
hold that the law is only that which is consistent with the very interpretive 
theory or value criterion that answers the “should” question.  Moreover, 
the thin-norms theory can explain, in a manner that competing theories 
cannot, an even larger and in some senses more obvious phenomenon: 
the stability and durability of the constitutional system despite various 
apparently deep disagreements of method and value. 
Another accepted criterion, conservatism, suggests that desirable 
descriptive theory should leave intact other of our well-accepted views 
about the world.46  Leiter maintains that legal positivism is more 
desirable than alternatives like natural law theories on this dimension 
because, among other things, positivism is consistent with, supported by, 
and potentially generative of empirical work on related issues.47   
A theory of law that makes explicit the tacit or inchoate concept at play 
in scientific research is probably to be preferred to its competitors.  If 
one surveys . . . the now vast literature on adjudication, which aims to 
explore the relative contributions of legal versus non-legal norms to 
decision-making by courts, that literature always demarcates the 
distinction in positivist terms.48 
So, too, the thin-norms account’s capacity to distinguish what the law 
is from what one thinks the law should be facilitates empirical analysis 
of the influence of legal versus non-legal reasons for decision.  Again, 
what matters on my view is that judges act as if they accept SPT and 
similar norms as valid norms of the constitutional system, and not, rather, 
act as though those norms are the reasons for that acceptance.  In other 
words, the law is the set of norms judges accept, regardless of their 
reasons, so that we can assess those reasons without conceding that 
discovering a particular set of reasons for acceptance of legal norms 
invalidates those norms.  Thus the thin-norms view is also consistent with 
nearly every theory of adjudication or of constitutional interpretation.  It 
leaves intact our well-established belief that the constitutional system is 
robust and stable despite observed disagreement.  Moreover, because it 
treats issued judicial decisions as instances of law and identifies 
consensus norms from patterns in judicial conclusions rather than their 
reasoning; the thin-norms theory is consistent with any account of the 
real causes of judicial decisions.49  Value-driven and interpretive theory-
 
46. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 320; Leiter, supra note 2, at 1239.  Some argue that this is more 
of an ex ante threshold for distinguishing facially plausible theories from those unworthy of serious 
consideration.  See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 2, at 1049. 
47. Leiter, supra note 2, at 12. 
48. Id. at 12. 
49. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
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of-law claims, however, are inconsistent with empirical work like that on 
the attitudinal model—they claim that judges should decide cases based 
on some set of values or interpretive commitments, but the empirical 
evidence suggests that such proposals are unrealistic in light of judges’ 
persistent tendency to act in ways not predicted by the relevant legal 
reasons.50 
A related criterion is fruitfulness—or the extent to which a theory 
“enable[s] us to say significant things, generate[s] insights, and ha[s] 
implications for future research.”51  Of course it is not right to say that 
legal theory cannot generate predictive hypotheses.  The literature on the 
attitudinal model of judicial decision making, which tests the hypothesis 
that proxies for judges’ political views (such as the party of the appointing 
president), is widely viewed as a robust and successful predictive 
research program.52  This shows that legal theory can spur empirical 
research—the attitudinal model was prompted and supported by the 
theoretical claim of the American Legal Realists and others that legal 
reasons alone are insufficient to explain many judicial decisions.53  The 
abstractness of norms like SPT means that positing them has little 
predictive power in itself—without more, the hypothesis that SPT is 
accepted predicts some constellation of judicial actions aimed at 
preventing state interference with the constitutional structure.  That is 
what we see, but these observations are not terribly surprising and do not 
crisply distinguish the SPT view from other explanations.  Yet, the thin-
norms theory frames more determinate and testable hypotheses.  For 
example, the argument that SPT is implemented by a variety of doctrines 
whose differences are attributable to non-legal considerations is more 
fruitful: we could design experiments to test the likely causal power of 
various instrumental or other non-legal factors in doctrinal formulation; 
we would just need to find reliable proxies for things like judges’ concern 
about institutional capital, interbranch conflicts, adjudicatory error rates, 
 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 44–115 (2002) (presenting the attitudinal model of judicial 
decision making that tests for the causal power of non-legal reasons in adjudication). 
50. Id. 
51. Wendel, supra note 2, at 1053; accord Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321; PETER LIPTON, 
INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 34 (2004). 
52. Cf. Rob Robinson, Does Prosecutorial Experience “Balance Out” a Judge’s Liberal 
Tendencies?, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 143, 144 (2011) (arguing that “the ‘attitudinal model’ has proven 
remarkably robust in explaining much of the aggregate variance in appellate decisions” compared 
to other models measuring the influence of social background factors); Pauline T. Kim, Lower 
Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405–07 (2007) (arguing that the attitudinal model is 
incomplete; articulating various critiques and concluding that law’s independent normative force 
explains many judicial decisions). 
53. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
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among others.54 
There exists broad and long-lived consensus among scientists and 
philosophers of science on the foregoing criteria being generally 
correct.55  There appears to be no such consensus with respect to the 
propriety of some set of normative values of the kind that Fallon and 
Bartrum propose for choosing among normative constitutional theory 
theses (for example, democracy, rule of law, judicial constraint, 
substantive justice, and so forth).56  If we agree that robust consensus on 
theory selection is the best approximation of objectivity available, there 
is substantially more robust consensus with respect to the criteria I have 
mentioned for distinguishing scientific, social scientific, and descriptive 
constitutional theory claims—enough consensus for Kuhn to suggest that 
scientific theory selection decisions on these criteria can, over time, 
approach objectivity.57  The selection process I have outlined here, 
accordingly, does not suffer from the kind of instability that I argue 
threatens proposals for normative constitutional theory assessment. 
One conventionally cited criterion for assessing scientific theories—
Karl Popper’s idea of falsifiability58—is occasionally mentioned in legal 
scholarship59 and, of course, frequently discussed in judicial decisions 
involving the Daubert test for the reliability of expert testimony.60  
Falsifiability is, however, both contested among philosophers of science 
and a poor fit for legal theory.61  A scientific proposition is falsifiable if 
a statement about some occurrence is incompatible with the 
proposition;62 science on Popper’s view should proceed by “conjecture 
and refutation” in which proposed explanations for observed phenomena 
are tested not for conformance with corroborating evidence but by 
 
54. Of course, the truth of statements in responses to survey questions like this or, for example, 
“Do you accept SPT as obligatory even if you would not be sanctioned for violating it,” that capture 
Hart’s idea of the internal point of view, will generate answers that are ultimately unverifiable.  But 
that is an epistemic problem facing all survey evidence; we will have to use the best evidence rule 
and wait to be disproved. 
55. Kuhn, supra note 6, at 321. 
56. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
57. See Kuhn, supra note 6, at 325. 
58. See generally POPPER, LOGIC, supra note 23. 
59. See supra note 23 (canvassing legal scholars’ treatment of Popper’s view). 
60. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); see Susan Haack, Federal 
Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction—and a Reconstruction, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 394, 
417–27 (2010) (canvassing federal court treatments of Popper’s view under Daubert). 
61. By the time Popper was cited in Daubert, his views had been for the most part abandoned 
by mainstream philosophers of science.  See, e.g., Haack, supra note 60, at 415–16; David Stove, 
Cole Porter and Karl Popper: The Jazz Age in the Philosophy of Science, in AGAINST THE IDEALS 
OF THE AGE 3–8 (Roger Kimball ed., 1999); D.H. Mellor, The Popper Phenomenon, 52 PHIL. 195 
(1977). 
62. POPPER, LOGIC, supra note 23, at 86–87. 
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subjecting test after test designed to falsify the proposed explanation.63  
Falsifiability was Popper’s proposed criterion for demarcating real 
science from other kinds of pursuits that purport to be scientific (for 
instance, Popper argued that the latter category includes metaphysics, 
psychoanalysis, history, and so forth).64  Popper held other extreme views 
about science, including that science does not use inductive logic 
(because inductive logic cannot truly confirm any proposition as true), 
and that observation does not justify belief in the reality of what is 
observed.65 
Aside from these internecine struggles within the philosophy of 
science, there are reasons to hold falsifiability particularly inappropriate 
as a criterion for assessing competing constitutional theory claims.  The 
first problem is that falsifiability as a way to distinguish science from 
other forms of inquiry is inapt for assessing constitutional theory claims 
that do not purport to be scientific, but merely descriptive of the artifacts 
of human practice.  Another problem is the following: Assuming that 
constitutional norms are meaningfully constituted (validated) by patterns 
of convergent official practice of acceptance, then for claims of the form 
“Proposition X is a constitutional norm in system Y,” potentially 
falsifying counterexamples (e.g., a judicial decision in which the court 
upholds some state action that pretty clearly threatens structural stability) 
could be interpreted as either (1) proof that Proposition X is not in fact a 
norm of the system; or (2) evidence that Proposition X was (or perhaps 
still is) a norm of the system but that the official consensus that X is a 
norm is changing or has changed.  It is not obvious how, absent explicit 
judicial specification, we should decide between these two 
interpretations.  But it is possible in principle for SPT to be falsified by, 
say, an unambiguous judicial statement that it has never been a valid 
norm. 
C.  Normative Theory Assessment 
This is the hard part.  The vast majority of constitutional theory is 
normative, but this is the most difficult kind of theory for which to do 
metatheory.  Existing literature suggests normative criteria that are 
themselves at issue in the debates between competing theories, and that 
will not work, at least not without more. 
Again, start with their purpose: to make some improvement that 
 
63. Id. at 30–33. 
64. See id. at 40; KARL R. POPPER, UNENDED QUEST: AN INTELLECTUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
38–41 (rev ed. 1976). 
65. See POPPER, LOGIC, supra note 23, at 102–05. 
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maximizes some value.  So the general purpose is to give an account on 
which values are maximized.  The metatheoretical question, then, is 
“which value is preferable to maximize” (for example, should we prefer 
justice, or should we seek a balance between liberty and justice). 
The tiny literature to address this question directly suggests solving 
this problem (that these criteria are essentially contested by looking for 
values on which there is consensus); this resonates with Fallon’s more 
general claim that constitutional legitimacy can be established by 
sociological fact of consensus, but that does not solve the larger logical 
problem that this is question begging.  To put it abstractly, the 
metatheoretical question here is which of the following two theses is best 
or preferable: “We should do X to maximize value P” or “We should do 
Y to maximize value Q”? 
The task of metatheory here is to determine which value, P or Q, is to 
be preferred when it comes to maximizing values.  (Of course, there are 
lots of other criteria that could be applied to distinguish normative 
theories—feasibility, accuracy of the descriptive predicate, cost, side-
constraints, and so on; but here we want to assume those away as they do 
not answer the more basic question-begging problem of how to evaluate 
competing value claims).  I do not want to suggest that there is an answer 
here—Bartrum and Fallon suggest consensus, but that is not good enough 
as the question “which is more important, freedom or justice,” is one for 
which it is not obvious that “whichever everyone agrees is more 
important” is the best answer (even if everyone does, in fact, so agree).  
This is the old debate about whether there are moral truths or, in fact, 
morality is only relative. 
Even reading Fallon’s claim that most constitutional theorists agree on 
this set of normative criteria as a kind of descriptive sociological claim 
that there exists a convergent practice among legal officials and 
practitioners, it is not obvious that the claim is true or what its 
significance would be if it were true.  Bartrum says something similar: 
“‘constitutional values’ . . . [or] the important or essential purposes we 
ascribe to the Constitution within our democratic structure  . . . can 
provide some objective grounds to assess particular theory choices, even 
if the ultimate act of decision remains essentially subjective.”66  By 
“objective” here, he must mean something like “consistent with a broad 
and deep consensus of legal officials and the public”—and, indeed, he 
characterizes these “constitutional values” that provide the evaluative 
criteria as reflected in “extra-constitutional texts that have settled most 
deeply into our interpretive practice—under the hypothesis that those 
 
66. Bartrum, supra note 6, at 264 (emphasis added). 
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texts are canonical precisely because they speak forcefully to widely held 
ideas about what the Constitution means or how it should function.”67  
These claims alone are not evidence of the indicated consensus—and 
other theorists persuasively argue against the generality and durability of 
a consensus on constitutional values among either theorists or judges and 
practitioners.68  In addition, it is not clear that these sorts of values can be 
applied in a determinate enough way to serve as crisp criteria for 
distinguishing among competing theories.  Bartrum’s suggestion 
resonates in a general way with my view—I agree that we should seek 
consensus because, at the end of the day, consensus is what establishes 
whatever approximates the true facts of the matter of legal phenomena.  I 
just disagree that a sufficiently robust and definite consensus may be 
found on questions of political morality.  Even superficial agreement that 
recommendations for constitutional decision making should promote 
democracy seems likely to generate significant disagreement; such a 
standard would invite essential contestation on, among other things, the 
aspects of democracy (accountability, participation, actual actions 
reflecting majoritarian preferences, etc.) that should be maximized.69 
It might be that this kind of normative assessment is simply 
unavoidable in constitutional theory.  There is a fairly strong intuitive 
impulse toward this conclusion; and constitutional theory work is 
overwhelmingly normative.70  My own view, however, is that 
constitutional theory is not inescapably normative.  While the lack of 
descriptive constitutional theory might tell us something about the 
scholarly community’s implicit assessment of such work’s value—more 
likely, I think, it tells us something about what the community finds 
interesting71—it does not establish that descriptive theory is somehow 
 
67. Id. at 265. 
68. See Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
149, 149–50 (2004) (“When the ideological valence of Supreme Court decisions shifts, 
constitutional theorizing about judicial review tends to shift as well.  Over the last century or more 
there have been two general positions taken about judicial review: that it is a blight in a democratic 
system that must be curtailed and that it is a valued part of U.S. government essential to the 
protection of constitutional liberty. . . . Progressives and conservatives have advanced both 
positions (in various permutations) at different times, depending upon which position seemed most 
apt to present circumstances, given their political views.”); Dorf, supra note 20, at 603–05 (arguing 
that the appearance of consensus on the values Fallon points up is largely illusory). 
69. See Dorf, supra note 20, at 603–04 (“[A]greement (at a very high level of generality) about 
the constitutional values identified by Fallon pales in significance when contrasted with the 
disagreement about particulars.”). 
70. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 540–41. 
71. Cf. Gardner, supra note 18, at 202–03 (“[B]y itself [legal positivism’s core claim] does not 
point in favor of or against doing anything at all. . . . When a philosopher of law asserts a 
proposition that neither endorses nor criticizes what they do, but only identifies some necessary 
feature of what they do, lawyers and law teachers are often frustrated . . . [and] automatically start 
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impossible.  Normative constitutional theories of course differ from 
scientific theories in just the way that I have mentioned—normative 
theories purport to establish what should be the case; scientific theories 
purport to explain what is the case.  Normative constitutional theory, then, 
cannot “coerce agreement” in the same way that we like to think that 
scientific theories can.72  If one disagrees with the evaluative proposition 
driving the normative proposal (e.g., constitutionalism should be more 
democratic as a driver for “popular constitutionalist” proposals for 
reforming judicial review73), the proposal itself cannot change one’s 
mind because it presupposes agreement with the underlying evaluative 
claim. 
We need more work on these questions of normative theory 
assessment, and along different lines than what exists—consensus alone 
(for example, if a consensus arose that justice-seeking constitutionalism 
is the correct view of how our theoretical claims about constitutionalism 
or constitutional development should be formulated) without a showing 
that consensus is or should be the single criterion for prioritizing 
competing value systems.  Demonstrating that is a very deep task, and 
one for another day.  For the moment, and for our purposes, is it enough 
to note that normative theory assessment is a project that can proceed, 
along the foregoing lines.  This suggests that we might, at some point, 
actually arrive at some criterion or set of criteria P on the basis of which 
we might sort through normative constitutional theory claims and assign 
them their relative merits in a manner more comprehensive, systematic, 
and consistent with the best-going account of scientific theory 
assessment. 
II.  ASSESSING THE ANTI-EVASION THESES 
Now, I will demonstrate the broad applicability of the metatheoretical 
insights developed above by applying them to a relatively new, and quite 
technical, debate among competing narrow theses in constitutional 
theory.  The debate was sparked by Brannon Denning and Michael Kent’s 
argument in an important recent article that some rules of constitutional 
 
to search for hidden notes of endorsement or criticism, secret norms that they are being asked to 
follow. . . . They cannot accept that legal philosophy is not wholly (or even mainly) the backroom 
activity of identifying what is good or bad about legal practice . . . .  In this fundamentally anti-
philosophical climate, a thesis like [legal positivism’s core claim], which is inertly informative, is 
bound to become egregiously distorted.”). 
72. See Posner, supra note 1, at 4; Bartrum, supra note 6, at 272–73 (highlighting differences 
between normative constitutional theories of adjudication and scientific theories). 
73. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
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doctrine can be usefully distinguished from the standard category of 
“constitutional decision rules” developed in what we might call 
“metadoctrinal” constitutional theory over the last fifteen years.  Put 
roughly, the metadoctrinal approach treats constitutional doctrine—the 
rules, tests, and standards courts adopt to identify violations of 
constitutional permissions, prohibitions, or requirements—as a distinct 
and important subject of research and analysis.74  Denning and Kent’s 
article is a project with which I am sympathetic; and there is much about 
their description of constitutional doctrine that seems unquestionably 
correct.  The discussion in this Part is meant to demonstrate that the 
theory assessment criteria developed above are useful not just at a very 
high level of abstraction—as, for example, in judging between competing 
theories of the nature of law—but at a finer grain as well.  To that end, I 
will examine both the broad and the narrow theses advanced in Denning 
and Kent’s work along the theory assessment criteria developed in Part I. 
Denning and Kent clearly accept metadoctrinalism’s “two-output 
thesis” (“TOT”),75 specifically: “‘there exists a conceptual distinction 
between two sorts of judicial work product each of which is integral to 
the functioning of constitutional adjudication,’ namely judge-interpreted 
constitutional meaning [or constitutional operative propositions] and 
judge-crafted tests bearing an instrumental relationship to that meaning 
[or constitutional decision rules].”76  The authors’ description and 
examination of Anti-Evasion Doctrines (“AEDs”) is an exercise in 
applied metadoctrinal theory.  They identify as AEDs rules of 
constitutional doctrine of the following form: “X violates constitutional 
requirement Θ even though X satisfies doctrinal rule, test, or standard Y, 
where Y also purports to identify violations of Θ.”77  In addition to 
highlighting examples of doctrines taking this form in a wide variety of 
constitutional contexts, the authors advance the following core claims: 
(1) There exist certain constitutional decision rules—AEDs—that are 
conceptually distinct from standard constitutional decision rules in one or 
 
74. See Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 220, 220 (2006) [hereinafter Berman, Rights]; see also Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional 
Decisions Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 2, 4 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Rules] (“Insofar as this strain of 
scholarship concerns itself with the fact of doctrine but not with its particular content, we may fairly 
term it metadoctrinal.”). 
75. See Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitutional 
Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1775, 1818–21. 
76. Berman, Rights, supra note 74, at 221 (quoting Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 36). 
77. An example of this form is rational basis review for discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation; this kind of discrimination probably violates the Equal Protection Clause, but almost 
always satisfies rational basis review—the doctrinal test courts use to identify constitutional 
violations in this context. 
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more of the following senses: logical structure (they are always structured 
differently than standard decision rules); logical priority (they are 
analytically subsequent to some standard decision rule(s)); function (they 
supplement standard decision rules rather than replace them); or 
justification (they are adopted for reasons distinct from the instrumental 
considerations that bear on the implementation of constitutional operative 
propositions, which shape standard decision rules).  Call this the 
Distinctiveness Thesis (“DT”).  (2) Identifying and distinguishing AEDs 
as a category of constitutional decision rules yields theoretical benefits 
beyond the merely taxonomical—that is, beyond merely adding another 
more-or-less correct bit of nuance to our positive account of 
constitutional doctrine on the metadoctrinal model.  Call this the Value 
Thesis (“VT”). 
Denning and Kent’s identification of AEDs across doctrinal areas is an 
impressive contribution in itself—metadoctrinal theory takes trans-
substantive doctrinal analysis as an important office.  Now one and a half 
decades old78—and with still older analytical precursors79—it is a mature 
branch of constitutional theory in the sense that its methodology and 
objectives have been thoroughly explored and defended.80  But it is also 
a field in which much substantive work remains to be done, and thus it is 
worth assessing Denning & Kent’s contribution as it relates to the broader 
methods and aims of the metadoctrinal program.  In Section A, I assess 
DT by exploring what, exactly, Denning and Kent have identified that is 
new or previously under-examined.  Because DT’s truth is a premise of 
VT, if DT is in some sense true, then VT is likely true.  I leave it to others, 
however, to evaluate VT in greater detail.  In Section B, I examine several 
deeper questions raised by the authors’ AED-identification project and 
evaluate metadoctrinal theory’s capacity to generate answers.  
Completion of this examination revels that another of Denning and 
Kent’s contributions is to highlight some of metadoctrinalism’s limits. 
 
78. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997) (widely recognized as the formative work in modern 
metadoctrinal theory). 
79. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional 
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status 
of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
80. See generally Berman, Rules, supra note 74.  See also Pursley, supra note 34, at 502–12 
(2012); Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 417, 424–28 (2008); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the 
Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655–86 (2005), all of which explore 
the theory before applying it to various specific doctrinal controversies. 
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A.  Anti-Evasion’s Distinctiveness 
First, I want to clarify Denning and Kent’s Distinctiveness Thesis.  
Here, I will examine whether they have identified a conceptually distinct 
category of constitutional doctrine.  I then turn to consider whether they 
have identified a previously under-examined factor in judicial reasoning 
concerning doctrinal formulation.  The latter possibility turns out to be 
more plausible and therefore is more likely an accurate statement of 
Denning and Kent’s core claim. 
1.  Taxonomy and Conceptual Distinctions 
Denning and Kent claim that AEDs are distinct from other forms of 
constitutional doctrine, and by this they might mean any of several things: 
They might mean, first, that AEDs as a form of constitutional doctrine 
are conceptually distinct from constitutional operative propositions and 
constitutional decision rules, the two categories of doctrine identified by 
the current metadoctrinal taxonomy.81  If the goal of that taxonomic 
project is to develop a full account of “the conceptual structure of 
constitutional doctrine,”82 then our question should be whether Denning 
and Kent have identified a doctrinal phenomenon of distinct conceptual 
structure to that which has already been described in the literature.  
Insight into the distinctiveness of AEDs will help to show the extent to 
which Denning and Kent’s work promises to advance metadoctrinalism’s 
second central aim—to leverage a robust positive account of doctrine qua 
doctrine into normative advances in constitutional theory. 
Metadoctrinal theorists have developed several central theses that, 
taken together, help establish the properties of operative propositions and 
decision rules.  The most important of these theses is TOT,83 but there is 
also an instrumental reasoning thesis (“IRT”), namely: “Decision rules 
bear an instrumental relationship to operative propositions both in the 
sense that they are designed to implement the operative proposition, and 
in the sense that decision rules’ content is determined by instrumental 
considerations bearing on that purpose of implementation.”84  Third, a 
necessity thesis (“NT”) holds that because courts will face some degree 
 
81. Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 4. 
82. Id. at 7. 
83. See supra text accompanying note 73.  See generally Berman, Rights, supra note 74. 
84. See Berman, Rights, supra note 74 (combining instrumental reasoning and TOT); Pursley, 
supra note 34, at 506–08 (exploring this thesis); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and 
Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1521–23 
(2004) [hereinafter Berman, Guillen] (exploring instrumental factors that arguably shape 
Commerce Clause decision rules); Roosevelt, supra note 80, at 1659–64 (paralleling Berman, but 
in the equal protection context). 
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of epistemic uncertainty in every case—for example, they cannot know 
with perfect certainty whether Congress has drawn a race-based 
distinction on the basis of unlawful animus—constitutional adjudication 
always requires the formulation of a decision rule or the use of a 
preexisting decision rule.85  This does not mean that every operative 
proposition requires a decision rule—some operative propositions may 
go unenforced.  Nor does it mean that every decision rule must be 
explicitly articulated by a court—some may simply operate invisibly in 
the background.  The default decision rule instructs courts to find a 
constitutional violation if they find φ fact(s) by a preponderance of 
evidence.86 
Let us, then, first consider conservatism (the ability of claims to coexist 
with other well-established views about the world): how well do these 
AED theses fit with the central theses of metadoctrinal theory?  AEDs 
have all the essential properties of decision rules.  They are designed to 
implement constitutional operative propositions;87 they are shaped by 
instrumental considerations—for example, as Denning and Kent 
emphasize, AEDs often seem supported by calculations about the 
adjudicatory error rate in the form of false negatives, or holdings of 
constitutionality where the action actually violates the relevant operative 
proposition because of imprecisely fitting decision rules, and other 
considerations relevant to the accuracy and efficiency of judicial 
implementation of the operative proposition.  The authors draw from the 
risk-regulation literature to contend that courts do and should strive for 
optimal, not maximal, enforcement of constitutional operative 
propositions in making doctrine; this suggests that they believe courts 
may choose to adopt AEDs for instrumental reasons, consistent with 
IRT.88  And as AEDs do not appear to be propositional statements of 
constitutional meaning, they are likely not mislabeled operative 
propositions.  The authors stress that AEDs take a variety of forms—
purpose tests, effects tests, and so forth—and tend to be more standard-
like than rule-like.  This also does not distinguish them conceptually from 
 
85. See Berman, Guillen, supra note 84, at 1520–21. 
86. See Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 10–11.  There are other theses that are not essential to 
this discussion, but are central to metadoctrinalism’s contribution to constitutional theory—
including, for example, the interpretive agnosticism thesis, namely: Observing and affirming the 
distinction between operative propositions and decision rules entails no commitment to any theory 
of constitutional interpretation, and thus the two output thesis may be accepted by originalists and 
non-originalists alike.  The taxonomic value of the distinction, therefore, does not turn on resolving 
irresolvable interpretive debates.  See id. at 9, 57 n.192. 
87. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1776, 1793 (arguing AEDs implement constitutional 
principles). 
88. See id. at 1797–99 (discussing risk regulation). 
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other decision rules: The point of metadoctrinal taxonomy is to categorize 
doctrines by their structure, rather than by their content; and the standard 
decision rules category also includes all manner of bright-line rules, 
balancing tests, levels of scrutiny, and so forth.  They are all decision 
rules because they implement operative propositions and are shaped by 
instrumental concerns related to that implementation.  Examining AEDs’ 
specific content is certainly relevant to doctrinal analysis, or “thick 
description,” but it is not relevant to metadoctrinal taxonomy.89  AEDs 
are conceptually identical to primary decision rules in every sense 
relevant to metadoctrinal taxonomy. 
Denning and Kent claim that AEDs stand not only in the typical 
implementation relationship with operative propositions, but also in a 
relationship of supplementation with primary decision rules.90  Perhaps 
this special relationship with regular decision rules makes AEDs 
distinctive.  For this to amount to a structural distinction, we would need 
an argument to establish that primary decision rules do not supplement 
other decision rules, at least not in the ordinary case.  But there is no 
argument to show that it would be in some sense incoherent to 
characterize, for example, the virtually per se antidiscrimination rule and 
Pike balancing test from the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as a pair 
of primary (co-equal) decision rules, both of which implement the 
underlying constitutional operative proposition and happen to 
compliment each other in the sense that each identifies violations of the 
operative proposition that the other does not.91  After all, what Denning 
and Kent characterize as the primary dormant Commerce Clause decision 
rules focus on discriminatory actions by one state against another, Pike 
identifies unduly burdensome but non-discriminatory actions.  It seems 
just as apt to characterize the Pike balancing test, which weighs a state 
action’s burden on interstate relations against its local benefits, as “the 
second dormant Commerce Clause decision rule,” or even to suggest that 
the dormant Commerce Clause is implemented with a single decision rule 
containing a variety of complex conjunctions and alternatives.  Denning 
 
89. Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 6–7 (distinguishing the general logical structure of 
doctrine from the question of specific doctrines); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 77 (2001) (emphasizing that his doctrinal types were “a bit of 
a hodgepodge” and of little theoretical importance). 
90. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1808 (stating that AEDs are “decision rules that assist 
other decision rules in the implementation of operative propositions”). 
91. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (virtually per se invalidity rule for 
facial discrimination); Pike v. Bruch Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (articulating the 
catchall balancing test); see Pursley, supra note 80, at 538–44 (discussing these doctrines as 
decision rules); see also Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1789–90 (characterizing the Pike test 
as an AED). 
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and Kent acknowledge that some decision rules do look like this—they 
quote Professor Berman’s lengthy “partial stab” at stating the First 
Amendment Free Speech Clause’s decision rule as an example of this 
kind of complexity.92  There is nothing distinctive, then, about decision 
rules that are paired with other decision rules to implement constitutional 
operative propositions as a system of rules. 
These observations do not necessarily undermine DT.  There are yet 
other potentially distinguishing features: There is the matter of how 
AEDs and primary decision rules function together.  Denning and Kent 
argue that AEDs are distinctive insofar as they supplement, rather than 
replace (or interact in some other way with) primary decision rules.  This, 
of course, is not unique to AEDs; a later-formulated decision rule 
instructing courts to defer to Congress in a certain subset of, for example, 
Equal Protection Clause disputes in which the Court typically applies a 
stringent standard of review—an exception likely to produce more false 
negatives, in other words—would supplement the primary decision rule 
in precisely the way Denning and Kent have in mind (changing the 
number and kind of violations the relevant set of decision rules identify), 
but Denning and Kent would not call our hypothetical supplement an 
AED as it does not increase the likelihood of identifying actual 
constitutional violations. 
Relatedly, it is not clear that all of the identified AEDs merely 
supplement the primary decision rule(s).  Some, like the later Commerce 
Clause doctrines, seem to be substitutes for preexisting decision rules, as 
Denning and Kent concede.93  The difference is significant in principle: 
In the case of supplementation, all of the decision rules must be 
considered invalid in each case and action violating the primary decision 
rule but not the AED (and vice versa).  In the case of substitution, only 
the later-adopted decision rule need be considered and actions that violate 
the earlier rule but not the later are not invalid.  Indeed, in the case of 
substitution, it is inapt to characterize the later rule as dealing with 
“evasions” of constitutional norms by way of formal compliance with the 
former rule because such compliance would yield no benefit to the actor.  
Denning and Kent elide this distinction, arguing that “the ebb and flow 
of constitutional adjudication tends to” go according to the 
supplementation pattern that they identify.94  But this conflation calls into 
question their claim that true supplementary AEDs are “ubiquitous” in 
 
92. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules: 
Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMM. 39, 39–40 (2010). 
93. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1793–94. 
94. Id. at 1793. 
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constitutional doctrine.95  The extent to which later-added decision rules 
are in fact supplementary AEDs, rather than substitute decision rules, is 
an empirical question that the authors do not purport to answer.  But it 
suggests that the explanatory power—the consilience—of the AED 
theses may be problematic. 
Much the same line refutes other proffered grounds for distinction.  
The authors might distinguish AEDs by their temporal relationship to 
primary decision rules—some AEDs are adopted after the primary 
rules—but this is historical accident that even Denning and Kent concede 
cannot be significant.96  Again, consider the Equal Protection Clause 
example—adding a decision rule that decreases judicial enforcement of 
the relevant norm, even if it was adopted long after the primary decision 
rule, would not make it an AED.  It would just be a second decision rule.  
So, too, the claim that AEDs tend to be “standard-like” while the primary 
decision rules that they supplement tend to be more “rule-like” does not 
distinguish AEDs from other constitutional decision rules, because the 
category of decision rules by definition includes both rule-like and 
standard-like doctrines.97  While scholars sometimes for the sake of 
contrast characterize doctrine on binaries—deferential or non-deferential, 
rule-like or standard-like, and so forth—few would deny that many 
decision rules have characteristics that resist such simple division.98  
Think, for example, of the Miranda doctrine—a rule-like primary 
decision rule99—and the “substantial effects” prong of the modern 
Commerce Clause doctrine—a clearly standard-like primary decision 
rule.100 
AEDs, then, are conceptually indistinguishable from other 
constitutional decision rules on the properties we have examined so far.  
That suggests that assigning them a separate category serves some 
purpose other than to contribute to the metadoctrinal taxonomic 
 
95. Id. at 1777–78. 
96. See id. at 1779 n.34 (acknowledging that “it may not always be the case that the ‘other’ rules 
to which AEDs respond were developed prior to the AED itself,” and “we think our analysis is the 
same regardless” of the chronological facts). 
97. See id. at 1801–02 (AEDs typically standard-like). 
98. This is what Denning and Kent refer to as a “dualist” tendency in metadoctrinalism; I do 
not think it is either as pervasive as they say and I do not think it reflects widespread 
misunderstanding of the doctrine’s true complexity.  See id. at 1776 (“[W]e attempt to unsettle this 
[dualist] view of doctrinal design . . . .”). 
99. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966); Berman, Rules, supra note 
74, at 116–24 (dividing the Miranda doctrine into operative proposition and decision rule). 
100. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1996) (canonizing the now famous “items 
of interstate commerce, channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or things with a 
substantial relationship to interstate commerce” standard for judging the permissible reach of the 
commerce power).  See also Berman, supra note 84. 
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project.101  That is not to say that Denning and Kent have failed to 
highlight an interesting form of decision rule—AEDs surely exist in some 
contexts; and drawing correct generalizations concerning their form and 
functions certainly improves our understanding of constitutional practice.  
It just does not add a conceptually distinct category to our metadoctrinal 
taxonomy.  Adding another distinction to the metadoctrinal picture is in 
tension with our simplicity criterion for theory choice. 
Now, finally, let us consider fruitfulness—the “test of results.”  None 
of Denning and Kent’s normative claims are fully undermined by the 
foregoing conclusions.  They claim that their account of AEDs (1) rebuts 
Nagel’s critique of courts reveling in doctrine for its own sake at the 
expense of careful attention to constitutional meaning;102 (2) provides 
evidence for Schauer’s contention that rules and standards frequently 
converge in practice as a result of actors iterative adaptations to either 
form of requirement;103 and (3) provides evidence that the study of 
doctrine qua doctrine is valuable in constitutional theory.104  Luckily, 
none of these normative implications depend on AEDs being 
conceptually distinct from constitutional decision rules—all of the 
foregoing effects are created by acknowledgement of the distinction 
between operative proposition and decision rule and the ubiquity of 
decision rules (acceptance of TOT and NT) almost as logical entailments: 
The implementing relationship between decision rules and operative 
propositions demonstrates courts’ continuing attention to constitutional 
norms even in the midst of complex doctrinal formulation, rebutting 
Nagel’s claim.105  The well-documented existence of constitutional 
decision rules that have either been changed over time from formalistic 
rules to more realistic standards, that incorporate both rule-like and 
standard-like components, or that are ostensibly rule-like but so riddled 
by exceptions that their application is unpredictable, are striking evidence 
of Schauer’s convergence thesis with no need for additional support from 
AEDs in particular106—though AEDs do tend to take these convergent 
 
101. Cf. Berman, supra note 84, at 4–5 (desiring to contribute to metadoctrinal taxonomy 
project). 
102. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1816, 1817–21; Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic 
Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985). 
103. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1816, 1826–31; Frederick Schauer, The 
Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303. 
104. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1816. 
105. The authors apparently agree on this point; they argue that implementing doctrine vel non 
rebuts Nagel’s critique.  Id. at 1819–20. 
106. See, e.g., Berman, Rules, supra note 75, at 61–78; Pursley, supra note 34, at 506–12, 537–
62; Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 983 (2010). 
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forms.107  Rehearsing the familiar rules versus standards debate also 
usefully highlights the kind of instrumental considerations that bear on 
doctrinal formulation—critiques of both forms of decision rule embody 
classical concerns about error rate, error cost, manageability, signaling 
value, and so forth,108 which serves conservatism.  And emphasizing the 
importance of focusing on “the fact of doctrine” in constitutional 
adjudication is a central aim of metadoctrinalism generally.  But none of 
this necessarily undermines the value of Denning and Kent’s catalogue 
of these rules—we need to think again about the force of their 
contribution. 
2.  The Anti-Circumvention Reason 
To salvage DT, Denning and Kent likely would argue that AEDs 
warrant separate treatment because they are adopted for a particular 
reason—one that is complex, contestable, and not involved uniformly in 
all instances of doctrinal formulation.  That is, our metatheoretical 
framework suggests that their argument is better read not so that AEDs 
themselves are conceptually distinct from the primary decision rules that 
they supplement, but rather that focusing on decision rules that take the 
form of AEDs highlights an important and under-scrutinized category of 
reasons that judges and justices may rely upon in doctrinal formulation.  
So far, theorists have focused for the most part on the instrumental 
considerations that arise upon asking “how may a constitutional norm (or 
operative proposition), Θ, best be implemented?”  Here, “best 
implementation” encompasses more than the goal of identifying all 
violations of the norm; it includes things like minimizing inter-
institutional friction, the chances of adjudicatory error, the costs of 
decision, and so forth.109  These are the standard instrumental 
considerations that bear on implementing constitutional operative 
propositions.  Denning and Kent draw our attention to another set of 
considerations that might arise upon asking a slightly different question: 
“How can we improve the constitutional decision rules that we have put 
in place (or are planning to adopt) to implement Θ?”  Denning and Kent’s 
exploration of AEDs highlights the wide variety of contexts in which this 
kind of reasoning might be at work in doctrinal formulation.  This is 
certainly something new, and it suggests that their claims may indeed be 
fruitful. 
 
107. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1826–28. 
108. Id. at 1797–1813 (discussing at length the benefits and detriments of rules and standards, 
among other reasons to value or doubt the value of AEDs). 
109. Id. at 506–12. 
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Of course, one basic concern in the formulation of decision rules is 
“fit”—how to craft rules that will “catch” a large percentage of violations 
of, in this instance, underlying operative proposition Θ.  But this process 
of reasoning will hardly ever be limited to that question—other 
instrumental considerations are almost always on the table.  If, for 
example, an existing decision rule does a fairly good job of identifying 
instances in which Congress has violated Θ, but also invites such heavy 
judicial scrutiny of legislative motives that it causes significant inter-
branch friction, the latter characteristic of the rule could well be the one 
that motivates doctrinal revision.  Our hypothetical court might adopt a 
supplementary rule requiring deference where certain legislative-process 
conditions have been met (indicia of reasonable deliberation, for 
example); concerns about “fit” or circumvention need not always be the 
driving force.  We must be careful, for reasons of simplicity, not to assign 
any particular instrumental consideration greater weight than the others 
without a theoretical justification. 
But the fruitfulness of these theses is not yet entirely established.  
Denning and Kent have thus highlighted a particular kind of “fit” 
consideration associated with crafting decision rules that preclude 
“cleverly” crafted evasions under the guise of formal compliance.110  
Drawing attention to these anti-circumvention considerations is 
important because, without them, conventional instrumental reasoning 
would not always clearly favor adopting the decision rules that Denning 
and Kent label AEDs.  Grafting a standard-like supplement onto an 
existing rule-like test will seem, in some contexts, inconsistent with the 
relevant instrumental factors—it is likely to increase the rate of 
adjudicatory error, as standards often do; it may increase decision costs 
because of the increased fact-sensitivity of the hybrid rule; it may involve 
weighing factors that are at the outer limits of judicial competence, as 
with the assessment of state action’s “burden” on interstate commerce 
required by the Pike standard; and so forth.111  Anti-circumvention 
describes an underappreciated set of considerations that might justify 
adopting a standard-like AED despite other instrumental deficits. Those 
considerations are, however, instrumental—after all, in addition to its 
similarity to the basic “fit” concern, anti-circumvention is aimed at a 
particular kind of adjudicatory error, that of allowing “constitutional 
principles to be undermined by subterfuge and artifice.”112  It remains 
 
110. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1778–80. 
111. See Pike v. Bruch Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Pursley, supra note 34, at 506–
12 (canvassing instrumental determinants of doctrine); see also Denning & Kent, supra note 78, at 
1804–07 (acknowledging these and other problems with standard-like AEDs generally). 
112. Denning & Kent, supra note 78, at 1804. 
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unclear what weight courts should assign anti-circumvention 
consideration in the doctrinal calculation. 
Furthermore, it is not obvious that every decision rule labeled here and 
AED depends primarily on the anti-circumvention factor.  For at least 
some decision rules that look like AEDs, a different instrumental 
justification is possible.  The Pike balancing test might be the background 
decision rule of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine—it certainly is the 
most capacious—and it might raise institutional competence concerns 
serious enough to warrant adopting the more formalistic dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrines, virtually a per se invalidity rule for facial 
discrimination, to reduce the risk of adjudicatory error.113  The anti-
circumvention concern, then, is not necessary to a plausible explanation 
of every doctrine classifiable as an AED.  This is a simplicity problem.  
Yet, it is beyond question that Denning and Kent have identified a kind 
of implementation-related concern that might—and probably frequently 
does—bear on doctrinal formulation in various contexts.  And a focused 
analysis of the reasons on which courts rely in doctrinal formulation, or 
a subset of those reasons, fills a continuing gap in the metadoctrinal 
literature.  Again, fruitfulness here is an attractive reason to consider the 
AED account. Fallon, for example, recently examined the role of 
concerns about “judicially manageable standards” in doctrinal 
formulation.114  As a study of reasons for doctrinal choice, these theses 
seem capable of adding quite a bit to the research program. 
B.  Anti-Evasion, Constitutional Operative Propositions, and Norms 
Now, we examine the fruitfulness—the explanatory power—of this 
view in greater detail.  The idea of anti-circumvention reasons for 
formulating decision rules is powerful, has a great deal of intuitive 
appeal, and is a novel contribution to the metadoctrinal literature.  But 
metadoctrinal theorists also seek to leverage taxonomic insights to 
answer deep questions at the heart of constitutional theory.  Roosevelt 
uses the TOT and an analysis of the relationship between decision rules 
and potential operative propositions in certain constitutional rights 
contexts to draw deeper lessons about the legitimacy of judicial review in 
constitutional cases;115 Berman uses the distinction to lay bare the full 
range of reasons courts might consider in deciding constitutional 
cases;116 and I examine existing decision rules to formulate and test 
 
113. See sources cited supra note 91. 
114. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional 
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006). 
115. See generally Roosevelt, supra note 80. 
116. See, e.g., Berman, Rules, supra note 74; Berman, supra note  84; Mitchell N. Berman, 
15_PURSLEY FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)(DO NOT DELETE) 
1364 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
hypotheses about the content of the constitutional norms that actually 
operate in our system in areas where the norms are obscure;117 among 
others.  Other deep questions on which metadoctrinal analysis might 
provide leverage include questions about the nature and extent of 
constitutional obligation; the proper role of courts and other government 
institutions in the process of constitutional development and 
implementation; the real reasons for judicial decisions and the legitimacy 
of those reasons; and the legitimacy of judicial over- and 
underenforcement of constitutional norms.  Here, I want to briefly 
address a number of these deep questions raised by Denning and Kent’s 
work. 
1.  Classificatory Certainty 
Examining factors bearing on the level of confidence we might have 
in Denning and Kent’s identification of specific decision rules as AEDs 
presents two of these deeper questions; at least insofar as there seems to 
be a problem.  Denning and Kent provide an extensive catalogue and 
analysis of a great many doctrines they say are, in fact, AEDs.  But are 
they really?  Can we be certain?  There seem to be two possible criteria 
of reliability, based on the definition of an AED that we have sketched—
a test of cause and a test of function.  We might be confident that a 
decision rule is an AED if there are compelling reasons to believe that it 
was adopted based on the anti-circumvention concern; we might also be 
confident of AED status if we knew with certainty that it implements the 
underlying operative proposition in a manner that supplements the 
primary decision rules by catching one or more of those “clever” attempts 
to subvert the operative proposition despite formal compliance with the 
primary decision rules.  However, both approaches run up against 
significant conceptual questions that Denning and Kent do not attempt to 
answer.  Those answers may well be beyond the ken of metadoctrinal 
theory generally. 
2.  The Question of Operative Propositions 
Another way in which the AED account may fail on the simplicity 
criterion has to do with AEDs’ relationship to constitutional operative 
propositions.  Denning and Kent’s definition requires that the AED bear 
a particular relationship to the operative proposition—implementing it by 
identifying violations that are instances of “formal” compliance with 
existing decision rules but also are “cleverly concealed” violations of the 
 
Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2005). 
117. See generally Pursley, supra note 34. 
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operative proposition—that is, violations that would not be identified as 
violations by the primary decision rule(s).118  There is a logical difficulty 
with simultaneously distinguishing AEDs from primary decision rules 
and characterizing them as implementing operative propositions.  Taking 
TOT and IRT as true, it seems that AEDs must either implement the 
operative proposition in the standard way and thus be indistinguishable 
from other decision rules, rendering the authors’ distinction artificial; or 
AEDs must also stand in a relationship with other parts of constitutional 
doctrine that is not one of conventional operative-proposition 
implementation.  Denning and Kent maintain that they do—AEDs are 
aimed at a specific subset of operative-proposition violations, those that 
comply with the letter of the primary decision rule but nevertheless 
violate the operative proposition.  Indeed, the authors define AEDs as 
decision rules that do in fact implement constitutional operative 
propositions in this special sense.  But how do they determine whether 
the violations identified by the AED are fairly characterized as operative-
proposition violations?  Might they be conventional decision rules 
implementing operative propositions in the conventional way?  Or, might 
they be designed to identify “cleverly concealed” violations not of the 
operative proposition, but of other decision rules—“catching” actions 
that follow the letter of the rule but betray its spirit?  Much turns on the 
answer. 
The authors must and do rely heavily on assumed operative 
propositions in categorizing doctrines as AEDs.  For example, in the 
dormant Commerce Clause context, they formulate the operative 
proposition as: “States may not interfere with interstate commerce in 
ways that undermine or inhibit national political unity.”119  From this, 
they reason that the virtually per se invalidity decision rule applicable to 
facial discrimination overenforces the operative proposition (presumably 
because there may be instances of facial discrimination against out-of-
state commerce that does not adversely effect “national political unity”); 
and they contend that the broader and “more lenient” Pike balancing test 
is an AED—a bad one, they argue, but an AED nonetheless—that “aids 
in eliminating covert discrimination” so well hidden that it would not be 
identified as discriminatory in virtue of purpose effects by other dormant 
Commerce Clause decision rules that Denning and Kent also characterize 
 
118. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1796 (“AEDs typically are decision rules fashioned as 
standards that, in turn, ensure that governmental officials cannot easily evade or undermine 
constitutional principles by formal compliance with rule-like decision rules implementing those 
constitutional commands.”). 
119. Id. at 1776–77. 
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as AEDs.120  Pike, on this line, is an AED because it identifies state 
commercial actions that might “undermine national political unity” by 
covertly discriminating against out of state commerce and because it 
“catches” operative-proposition violations that the discrimination-
focused decision rules would miss.  It both implements the operative 
proposition and supplements the other decision rules. 
Now notice the obvious problem with stipulating operative-
proposition content.  Denning and Kent’s proposed dormant Commerce 
Clause operative proposition is plausible—compelling, even—but it is 
not the only one.  The constitutional basis for the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine is hotly contested, even as some version of the doctrine 
has been on the books for nearly two centuries.121  That is so in part 
because (1) operative propositions are not always clearly distinguishable 
from decision rules;122 (2) operative propositions are not always 
articulated even where their decision rules are applied;123 and (3) 
operative propositions are products of constitutional interpretation, which 
itself is riven by an insoluble methodological debate.124  Some decision 
rules, then, may constitute incompletely theorized agreements on how to 
implement operative propositions on whose content judges or justices 
disagree.125  Denning and Kent offer no interpretive arguments for their 
dormant Commerce Clause operative proposition here (although Denning 
defends it at length in earlier articles126).  If we change our assumed 
 
120. Id. at 1810–11.  Elsewhere, I have characterized the discriminatory purpose and 
discriminatory effects tests as corollaries of the virtually per se rule—a single antidiscrimination 
decision rule with three “prongs.”  I find this characterization simpler and consistent with the cases; 
but the difference is of little importance here.  Pursley, supra note34, at 538–39. 
121. See Pursley, supra note 34, at 498–500 (canvassing debate); id. at 543–44 (noting other 
operative propositions proposed to explain dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); Denning, supra 
note 80, at 478–86.  Current Supreme Court Justices have argued publicly that the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine is illegitimate, “an unjustified judicial intervention.”  Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Tracey, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).  On the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s age, arguably the first Supreme Court decisions to treat the Commerce Clause a limitation 
of state power were the hoary Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188–89, 209 (1824), and 
Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829); see Norman R. Williams, 
Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1398 (2004); Denning, supra note 81, at 428–29. 
122. Pursley, supra note 34, at 506–12, 530–31. 
123. Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 59. 
124. Id. at 9 (explaining that operative propositions are interpretive by definition); Pursley, 
supra note 34, at 536–37 (interpretive debates may be unresolvable).  See generally Mitchell N. 
Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (noting literally dozens of forms of 
originalism and charting myriad dimensions of interpretive disagreement). 
125. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995) 
(suggesting that well-functioning legal systems produce incomplete theorized agreements despite 
disagreement on fundamental principles). 
126. See Denning, supra note 81, at 484–87 n.382. (arguing that the Commerce Clause restricts 
state actions through taxing or regulation that would undermine political union).  See generally 
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operative proposition to “states may not take actions that threaten to 
undermine the constitutional structure,” then the Pike balancing test could 
well be the primary or default decision rule—a straightforward judicial 
assessment of the degree of state interference with other states and its 
justifiability.  And the antidiscrimination decision rule(s) might have 
been formulated to make it easier for courts to invalidated certain kinds 
of state action that are highly likely to have impermissibly destabilizing 
effects.127  Fit—or consilience—in other words, may be a problem. 
Metadoctrinal taxonomy is a powerful tool for mapping the conceptual 
structure of the doctrine that we have, but it does not really tell us much 
about why we have that doctrine and no other.  The theory is 
interpretively inert and thus gives no direct guidance on the content of 
operative propositions.128  But by identifying decision rules and 
distinguishing them, it does give us a new way to come at the problem 
without wading through the morass of interpretive theory—an approach 
that is important because the debates among advocates of competing 
theories of constitutional interpretation may well be unresolvable.  This 
powerfully suggests fruitfulness. 
3.  Claims About Decision Rule Types 
Now, let us move down one level of abstraction and work through the 
implications of these metatheoretical criteria to the process of developing 
claims within the confines of the metadoctrinal debate.  To move beyond 
taxonomic results, we may use a straightforward hypothesis-testing 
program.129  Denning and Kent must test the assumed operative 
propositions on which they base their AED designations against 
conventional accounts of the relevant operative propositions and other 
plausible hypotheses.  To choose among competing explanatory theories, 
recall: the simpler explanation is preferable to the more complex; the 
most capacious explanation is preferable to those that explain less of the 
relevant phenomena; and the explanation that leaves more of our well-
settled views about the world intact is preferable to those that displace 
many such views.  These criteria are cumulative—a great deal more 
simplicity may offset some displacement of well-settled beliefs; 
 
Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the 
Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37 (2005) (detailing state 
discrimination against interstate commerce during the Confederate-era). 
127. I make the case for this operative proposition and decision rule scheme at length elsewhere.  
See generally Pursley, supra note 34. 
128. See discussion and sources cited supra note 84. 
129. See, e.g., Pursley, supra note 34, at 530–32 (discussing an explanatory hypothesis for the 
existence of all the dormancy doctrines). 
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explaining most or all of the phenomena may offset some complexity; 
and so forth.130  For example, to determine whether the Pike standard and 
other dormant Commerce Clause decision rules are in fact AEDs requires 
knowing what the operative proposition is; to know that, we might test 
Denning and Kent’s hypothetical operative proposition against my 
version, or others, on these theoretical desiderata. 
Without greater certainty about the content of operative propositions—
in other words, without a better account of the constitutional norms that 
we have—we cannot verify AED designations and accordingly must at 
least bracket Denning and Kent’s claim that AEDs are ubiquitous. 
Real Reasons—The concepts of anti-evasion and anti-anti-evasion are 
at least in one sense familiar.  One might reformulate Denning and Kent’s 
central question as: why does some doctrine rest on formalistic 
distinctions and characterizations of government action while other 
doctrine asks more realistically after the causes and effects of such 
action?  Or, as Denning and Kent phrase it in their follow-on piece: “Why 
does the court sometimes engage in ‘anti-evasion’”—rejecting AEDs—
“and other times decline to do so?”131  This is a perennial question of 
constitutional theory; one usually phrased as a question of why courts 
choose to take a formalist or functionalist approach in various 
adjudicatory contexts.132  Accordingly, we wonder why the Court shifted 
from formalistic inquiries into Congress’s true purposes giving way to a 
functionalist approach with a significantly greater degree of deference to 
Congress in Commerce Clause cases;133 why it moved from formalist 
motive tests to a more functionalist acceptance of hypothetical rational 
government purposes in First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause 
cases;134 and so forth.  Denning and Kent contribute by taking this 
problem and others like it and generalizing them by fitting them into the 
metadoctrinal framework.  But the question remains difficult: what are 
the real reasons on the basis of which courts decide cases and formulate 
doctrines as they do?  To identify AEDs with certainty where we do not 
 
130. Leiter, supra note 2, at 1239–40 (citing W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 
64–82 (2d ed. 1978); Thagard, supra note 24. 
131. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Anti-Evasion in Constitutional Law, 41 
FLA. ST. L. REV. 397, 423 (2014). 
132. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers 
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987) (discussing formalist 
versus functional approach in the context of separation of powers). 
133. Compare, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918), and Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303–08 (1936), with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
134. Compare, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), with Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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know the content of the operative proposition, we must have reason to 
conclude that the decision rule was, in fact, adopted based on the anti-
circumvention concern. 
Assuming that we will have trouble identifying the precise operative 
propositions that many decision rules implement, we would naturally turn 
in our project of identifying the true AEDs to the test of cause; that is, the 
question of judicial reasons for doctrinal selection.  How can we 
determine whether putative AEDs are in fact motivated by the anti-
circumvention concern rather than some other reason(s)?  We might, 
following the authors, hypothesize that they are AEDs after observing the 
circumstances surrounding their adoption, the timing, their scope, 
content, and relationship to other decision rules.  But judicial adoption of 
some decision rules that Denning and Kent characterize as AEDs and 
Anti-Anti-Evasion Doctrines (“AAEDs”) on grounds of the 
circumvention concern can be explained, alternatively, as the result of 
other instrumental calculations.  Return to the dormant Commerce Clause 
example.  If we accept Denning and Kent’s assumed operative 
proposition,135 we still might characterize Pike as the default decision 
rule that best “fits” the norm—weighing out-of-state effects against local 
benefits seems like one fairly straightforward, if basic, way to roughly 
assess a state action’s tendency to undermine political union.  The 
instrumental reasons to adopt such a rule initially might include its close 
fit with the operative propositions (there are no hard proxies to limit the 
range of actions potentially invalidated) and the high costs of 
adjudicatory error in the form of false negatives, which could include the 
actual destabilization of interstate peace.  But because of its imprecision 
and the complexity of the factors that courts must weigh in their 
application, Pike also imposes significant decision costs and, because of 
its fact sensitivity, provides very little signaling value.  If state 
discrimination against out-of-state commerce is a fair proxy for political 
destabilization—and post-Revolutionary War interstate economic crises 
suggest that this is so—then discrimination-oriented decision rules could 
reduce decision costs and, if it turns out that most litigated dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges involve some form of discrimination, 
reduce the rate of false-positive errors.  Cooley’s “national/local subject” 
test was an early precursor of Pike136—as Denning himself explained, 
 
135. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text; see also Denning & Kent, supra note 75, 
at 1775–76 (introducing the constitutional operative proposition). 
136. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (“[W]hatever subjects of 
[the Commerce] power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of 
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by 
Congress.”). 
15_PURSLEY FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)(DO NOT DELETE) 
1370 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  47 
quoting Taney Court historian Carl Swisher: Cooley’s decision rule 
required courts to answer quite Pike-like “questions of degree, questions 
of the extent of local need measured against the effects of local laws on 
interstate commerce.”137  Thus it is not implausible to hypothesize that 
Pike functions as the modern equivalent of the most basic and close-
fitting dormant Commerce Clause decision rule. 
Once again we have competing plausible accounts of the reasons the 
Court might have relied upon in adopting certain decision rules—one that 
is consistent with characterizing those rules as AEDs, and one that 
suggests they are merely standard decision rules.  Metadoctrinal theory, 
thus far, provides no criteria for distinguishing the correct set of reasons 
from among competing accounts; indeed, that may be an issue that no 
branch of legal theory yet can resolve.  The American Legal Realists 
suggested that courts do not make decisions based on legal reasons—at 
least not without also considering various non-legal reasons.138  Political 
theorists now work to quantify the extent to which political views affect 
judicial decision making.139  From the metadoctrinal viewpoint, the best 
we can do to demonstrate the most plausible account of courts’ real 
reasons for choosing particular doctrinal formulations is to test the 
competing explanatory hypotheses.  Denning and Kent offer one such 
hypothesis on this topic—that this cluster of doctrines is best explained 
as resulting from courts prioritizing the anti-circumvention concern in 
their instrumental reasoning.  They do not, however, test that hypothesis 
against competing accounts such as my error-cost calculation account, 
sketched above.  Again, the authors’ project seems unfinished. 
*** 
There is a related problem.  When courts conflate decision rules with 
operative propositions they may unwittingly design AEDs to prevent 
circumvention of the decision rule rather than the operative 
proposition.140  Roosevelt calls this “calcification” of doctrine—the 
doctrine becomes, through conflation and force of precedent, the de facto 
operative proposition.141  In many cases the distinction between 
 
137. Denning, supra note 80, at 437 (quoting 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 
1836–64, at 422 (1974)). 
138. See generally Brian R. Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, in 
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007). 
139. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); 
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 49. 
140. See, e.g., Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1810 (speculating that Pike may have resulted 
from such confusion). 
141. Roosevelt, supra note 80, at 1692–93; see also Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1808–
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thwarting circumvention of operative propositions and precluding 
circumvention of decision rules will not make much difference—
circumvention of the decision rule also will be circumvention of the 
operative proposition.  But they are not necessarily coextensive.  Decision 
rules that over- or underenforce their operative propositions will of 
necessity create false positives or false negatives (the operative 
proposition will sweep more broadly or more narrowly than the decision 
rule in these cases); either way, circumvention of the decision rule may 
not circumvent the operative proposition and vice versa.142  There is 
reason to worry that judges and justices might conflate the two—as 
Denning and Kent concede and I have just argued, operative propositions 
can be hard to separate from decision rules for a number of reasons.143  
They further concede that making identification of AEDs depend on both 
their relationship to operative propositions and their relationship to the 
primary decision rules increases the likelihood that courts and 
commentators may treat decision rules like operative propositions.  The 
AED inquiry, after all, frames analysis of the operative proposition in 
terms of the kinds of violations that the primary decision rule(s) were 
designed to identify but do not because of an insufficiently precise 
decision rule.  I have demonstrated that the relationship between AEDs 
and the underlying constitutional operative propositions is not as clear as 
the authors suppose.  An intense judicial focus on the risk of doctrinal 
circumvention (what Denning and Kent call “doctrinal arbitrage”144), 
combined with uncertainty about the content of operative propositions 
seems to make the task of judicial AED formulation (and scholarly AED 
identification) a recipe for calcification.  And calcification creates 
legitimacy problems. 
Denning and Kent acknowledge that holding other government actors 
to decision rules outside the adjudicatory context is problematic: it is not 
clear that decision rules are legitimately binding on anyone beyond the 
parties to a particular case; and it is not obvious that it would be desirable 
for Congress and the Executive to treat decision rules like binding 
 
12 (discussing the calcification problem). 
142. See Sager, supra note 79 (positing underenforcement); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic 
Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 123 
(1985) (treating the concept of overenforcement as identical to that of a prophylactic rule); cf. David 
A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 191 (1988) (discussing 
broader concept of prophylactic rules).  See generally Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 30–50 
(exploring prophylactic rules and the concept of underenforcement at length). 
143. See Denning & Kent, supra 75, at 1778 (“[A] focus on decision rules can obscure the 
principle the rules were meant to enforce, with the result that the doctrinal tail wags the 
constitutional dog.”). 
144. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1801–02 (discussing “doctrinal arbitrage”). 
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constitutional directives.145  But the debate is far from settled—there are 
arguments for treating decision rules as more or less binding beyond the 
four corners of the case.  Denning and Kent contend that AEDs promote 
“substantive fairness”—the value associated with allowing people “not 
merely to test the application of law to fact, but also to urge that their case 
is different from those that have gone before.”146  They “extend the reach 
of the rule[s] to activities not quite covered by it in a formal sense,” giving 
effect to “the sense that . . . it would be unfair and unjust to allow 
constitutional principles to be undermined by subterfuge and artifice.”147  
This is presented as a normative justification for AEDs generally; this is 
unnecessary for AEDS that in fact implement constitutional operative 
propositions, which are justified on whatever terms decision rules in 
general are justified (the substantive fairness argument certainly cannot 
justify the practice of making decision rules).  If the question were, 
instead, whether using AEDs to prevent circumvention of decision rules 
is legitimate despite the general objections to making doctrine binding, 
then this substantive fairness claim would, perhaps, be well presented.148  
Regardless, these are normative questions.  Metadoctrinal theory does not 
provide a method for assessing them; but the distinction between 
operative propositions and decision rules certainly adds important nuance 
to the debate.149 
The Permissible Gap—The TOT is consistent with a variety of general 
theories of constitutional practice—one is Sager’s concept of 
underenforcement, in which courts do not fully enforce all constitutional 
norms with doctrine, but nonjudicial officials remain bound to norms’ 
“full conceptual limits” of obligation.150  We can usefully reformulate 
this as the Permissible Gap Thesis (“PGT”), namely: “there is a 
permissible disparity between ‘doctrinal rights’ and ‘background 
rights.’”151  This gives us an account of a constitutional system in which 
judicial enforcement does not comprise the total potential effect of 
 
145. See id. at 1808–10.  See generally Roosevelt, supra note 80 (exploring these legitimacy 
problems at length); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three 
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002) (canvassing similar issues). 
146. Id. at 1803 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 995–
96 (1995)). 
147. Id. at 1804. 
148. Interestingly, if Denning and Kent were to argue that AEDs may legitimately be used to 
preclude “clever” violations of the spirit of decision rules; this might distinguish AEDS from 
standard decision rules conceptually on the dimension of function.  Decision rules implement 
operative propositions, but AEDs, on this hypothetical account, would enforce decision rules. 
149. Berman, Rules, supra note 74, at 32–33 n.18. 
150. See Sager, supra note 79, at 1221 (advancing thesis that underenforced constitutional 
norms should be understood as “legally valid to their full conceptual limit”). 
151. Berman, Rights, supra note 74 (citing and quoting Fallon, supra note 114, at 1323–31). 
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constitutional norms, one in which all government institutions and 
officials have constitutional obligations independent of the possibility of 
their judicial enforcement.  Sager builds on this insight to generate a 
vision of a justice-seeking constitutionalism in which the courts act in 
partnership with other branches to, over time in an iterative process, 
articulate and refine a set of constitutional obligations that are designed 
to maximize justice, broadly conceived, under contemporary 
circumstances.152  Whether and to what extent government institutions 
and actors can be expected to comply with constitutional norms without 
judicial enforcement is, of course, one of the deepest and most long-lived 
questions of constitutional theory.153 
The claim that AEDs are ubiquitous in constitutional law makes for a 
different picture of the system.  Denning and Kent’s focus on 
circumvention concerns suggests a lack of trust on the part of the 
judiciary that other government actors will comply with all constitutional 
obligations that lie within the norm-doctrine gap (“gap obligations”).  
Such mistrust is not inconsistent with maintaining that such obligations 
exist; as a normative matter we might even want to encourage less trust, 
deference, and so forth, on certain issues.  But for descriptive purposes, 
abandoning PGT’s corresponding blanket presumption of gap-obligation 
compliance capacity raises a question about the instrumental calculation 
involved where a court decides to underenforce a norm, defer to a 
coordinate branch, or otherwise leave a question of constitutional 
compliance to a nonjudicial actor.  Denning and Kent recognize that there 
are such instances—that would be difficult to deny.154  To justify these 
kinds of decision rules—some of which the authors call AAEDs in a 
follow-on piece155—we need criteria for trusting or mistrusting 
nonjudicial actors on norm compliance from context to context.  The 
authors do not provide such an account in that article; they focus instead 
on identifying what seem like judicial calculations that certain avenues 
of potential norm violation need to be addressed, without attending to the 
 
152. See generally LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). 
153. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 136 (1893) (engaging the question with respect to 
Congress).  More recent is Fallon’s magisterial treatment of the subject in the abstract.  Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraint, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975 (2009).  Entire symposia have been 
held on the value of pre-commitment strategies, like constitutionalism, for constraining 
governments.  See generally John Robertson, “Paying the Alligator”: Precommitment in Law, 
Bioethics, and Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1729 (2003). 
154. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 1776 (noting that doctrines can “overenforce or 
underenforce constitutional commands”). 
155. See generally Denning & Kent, supra note 131. 
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separate question of whether they should be addressed by courts or, 
instead, a different institution.  And it is difficult to think of generalizable 
criteria that do not reproduce the problem.  If, for example, we maintain 
that courts are justified in deferring compliance questions to Congress 
wherever the basic constitutional question is better suited for legislative 
judgment, we must argue that capacity entails or is a good proxy for 
fidelity, which is not obviously true.156 
Denning and Kent make something like this claim in their piece on 
AAEDs, arguing that courts appear to avoid adopting AEDs or reject 
preexisting AEDs where one reasonably could conclude that “the 
constitutional principle is adequately protected by robust political 
safeguards.”157  This is an intriguing possibility, but it relies on some key 
assumptions that go unexamined.  First, we still need to know whether 
the existence of political safeguards is a legitimate criterion for trusting 
coordinate branches to tend their gap obligations—Denning and Kent 
only argue that this appears to be the criterion courts have adopted, not 
that it is justified.  What factors are present where political safeguards 
operate that suggest we can trust the political process on constitutional 
compliance issues?  Denning and Kent propose something like a rough 
institutional competence calculation: where the constitutional 
compliance issue is salient in the political process, then there may be 
democratic pressure on institutions and officials to comply with 
constitutional obligations.158  At least, that is the view that they attribute 
to courts that reject AEDs.  But this reproduces the problem—or so it 
seems—because we are left to wonder why courts should trust the public 
to press for constitutional compliance, even if the issues are salient in 
principle.  Most public choice accounts suggest that voters care far more 
about substantive policy outcomes than they do constitutional 
(“framework”) issues in, for example, the federalism context,159 where 
 
156. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (positing a theory of 
justified judicial intervention predicated on assessing the extent to which an action has, or has not, 
passed through a sufficiently inclusive political vetting).  But see sources cited infra note 159. 
157. Denning & Kent, supra note 131, at 398. 
158. Id. at 422–25 (emphasizing the capacity of political processes to “police” or “monitor” for 
abuse and government compliance with certain constitutional norms). 
159. See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131 
(2004); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial 
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 103 (2004).  But cf. Robert A. Mikos, The Populist 
Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 1673–74 (2007) (analyzing survey evidence 
suggesting that some voters do care about federalism as a constitutional obligation in itself). 
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the political-safeguards argument for judicial underenforcement of 
constitutional norms has a sixty-year pedigree.160  Denning and Kent’s 
proposed criterion, then, is a gloss on the conventional institutional 
capacity calculation that we associate with the choice between deference 
and judicial scrutiny of legislative purpose—and that, of course, does not 
incorporate the trustworthiness evaluation that the anti-circumvention 
concern seems to require. 
We could explain decisions to reject AEDs in at least two other ways: 
First, they could be based on assessments of the comparative expertise of 
other branches on the particular constitutional compliance issue (most 
plausible, perhaps, in the Commerce Clause and foreign affairs powers 
contexts).  Second, they could be based on assessments of the extent to 
which the Constitution itself submits particular issues to administration 
by non-judicial departments (most plausible in the political question and 
federalism contexts).  These accounts suggest a generally trusting view 
of nonjudicial actors’ tendency to discharge gap obligations that is 
consistent with the presumption of constitutionality courts have long 
accorded government actions161 and different from Denning and Kent’s 
“bad person” theory of nonjudicial action.162  In contrast, of course, we 
have the public choice theory picture that portrays Congress as an 
agglomeration of self-interested actors who are as concerned with 
constitutional requirements as they are with other obstacles to their own 
goals, but no more.163  If this is the right view, it raises prima facie 
 
160. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954) (giving the seminal articulation of the political safeguards of federalism); Ernest A. Young, 
Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001) (canvassing the treatment of 
Wechsler’s theory in courts and scholarship). 
161. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).  For a strong formulation 
and defense of the presumption, rooted in the view that Congress, not the judiciary, is properly the 
primary interpreter of the Constitution, see generally Thayer, supra note 153, at 136.  But see 
Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 553–76 (2010) (critiquing 
various extreme departmentalist views, including Thayer’s). 
162. This is a reference to Justice Holmes’ famous theory of law that centered on the “bad 
man”—for a bad person only interested in avoiding legal sanction, the law is no more than how a 
court is likely to behave.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
459 (1897).  Holmes’s “prediction theory” of law was, famously, refuted by Hart as ignoring a 
phenomenon with which we are all familiar, the internal point of view in which one views laws to 
be obligation-imposing independent of the possibility of sanction.  HART, supra note 28, at 100–
03. 
163. See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 
50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1287 (2001) (reciting “realist” accounts of congressional behavior) (citing Ian 
Shapiro, Enough of Deliberation: Politics Is About Interests and Power, in DELIBERATIVE 
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 28 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999)); Edward 
L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of 
Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991). 
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circumvention concerns in every context.  Some preexisting decision 
rules may be more insensitive to manipulation than others, and that might 
explain why we do not need AEDs in some contexts; but that explanation 
is quite different form the one Denning and Kent offer. 
Once again we are left with competing hypotheses about judicial 
behavior that need to be tested but, as yet, have not been.  Metadoctrinal 
theory certainly does not provide an answer, or the path to an answer.  
And as for the justifiability of any of these views of non-judicial actors’ 
tendency to comply with their constitutional obligations; this sort of 
compliance, much of which will be in the form of refraining from acting, 
will be very challenging to quantify. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal theory needs a metatheory.  We cannot continue to debate the 
merits of positive and normative claims—such as claims about whether 
this or that theory of constitutional interpretation discloses the “truth” 
about what the constitutional law is—without a framework for evaluating 
which claim is more correct when they compete with one another.  
Drawing from the philosophy of science to create such a framework is 
capacious: it gives us analytical tools with which to assess competing 
claims; it may serve to legitimate legal theory against the common 
criticism represented by Judge Posner’s and Judge Wilkinson’s 
challenges to add rigor or close up shop.  Such a framework for 
comparative claim assessment may also be adapted to operate at several 
levels of generality; we could judge everything from claims about 
whether constitutional law is determined by consensus or moral merits 
on the one hand to claims about whether this or that doctrine of 
constitutional law should be characterized as a decision rule or an anti-
evasion doctrine on the other.  I have made preliminary efforts here; a 
practicable framework will take both more work from those involved in 
constitutional theory and the acceptance of the research program’s 
participants more broadly to gain traction.  I hope this will be the first 
step. 
